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manage the actions of many Agents hired by a Principal. We provide conditions ensuring that Pareto optima exist for
the Agents using the scalarization method associated with the multi-objective optimization problem and we solve the
problem of the Principal by finding optimal remunerations given to the Agents. We illustrate our study with a linear-
quadratic model by comparing the results obtained when we add a Planner in the Principal/multi-Agents problem
with the results obtained in the classical second-best case. More particularly in this example, we give necessary and
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1 Introduction
In 1992, Maastricht treaty, considered as the key stage in the European Union construction, pro-
posed the establishment of a single currency for its members to ensure a stability of prices inside
the EU. This date marks the birth of the euro, as the common currency of the eurozone, with the
creation of the European Institut Monetary to ensure the introduction of it, which has operated
until the creation in 1998 of a central bank for Europe, the European Central Bank. The ECB is
the decision-making center of the Eurosystem, which is one of the main component of the EU
(see for instance [38, Chapter 5, Section 2.5] for a description of its general role inside the EU)
to ensure the economical smooth functioning of the eurozone, and Maastricht Treaty contains
∗This work is supported by the ANR project Pacman, ANR-16-CE05-0027 and the Chair Financial Risks (Risk
Foundation, sponsored by Société Générale).
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some criteria that member states are supposed to respect. For instance, the Article 104-C stipu-
lates that "Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits" and some criteria to respect
it concern the Government budget balance, which does not have to exceed 3% of the GDP and
the debt-to-GDP ratio, which does not have to exceed 60%. If these benchmarks are exceeded,
through the Stability and Growth Pact, members of eurozone have accepted to follow a precise
procedure each year to reduce their debt. Even before the financial crisis of 2007-2008, these rules
have been discussed (see [33]), and since the Greek government-debt crisis this controversy has
been amplified.1 The fact is that the eurozone is very heterogeneous in the respect of Maastricht
criteria as showed in Table 1.
Table 1: Governement deficit/surplus in % of GDP and debt-to-GDP ratio in % for nine EU members in 2015.
Data from Eurostat.
EU members gov. deficit/surplus in % of GDP debt-to-GDP ratio in %
Estonia +0.1 10.1
Finland -2.8 63.6
France -3.5 96.2
Germany +0.7 71.2
Greece -7.5 177.4
Ireland -1.9 78.6
Italie -2.6 132.3
Lithuania -0.2 38.7
Spain -5.1 99.8
Euro area (19 countries) -2.1 90.4
The natural questions arising are the following:
a. How the ECB can provide incentives to EU members to respect the rules induced by Maas-
tricht treaty? Which kind of procedure is the more efficient?
b. How EU members have to interact for the welfare of the European Union?
The Greek government crisis has impacted all the eurozone and showed that members are strongly
correlated each others. Through this example we see that one difficulty of both the ECB and eu-
rozone members is to reach an optimal decision and equilibria to succeed in the global european
construction.
The example above, and more specially the problem a., describes the kind of investigations made
in the incentives theory starting in the 70’s (see among others [28, 29]) and is an illustration of a
Principal/Agent problem. More exactly, the classical framework considered is the following: a
Principal (she) aims at proposing to an Agent (he) a contract. The Agent can accept or reject the
contract proposed by the Principal and under acceptance conditions, he will provide a work to
manage the wealth of the Principal. However, the Principal is potentially imperfectly informed
about the actions of the Agent, by observing only the result of his work without any direct ac-
cess on it. The Principal thus designs a contract which maximizes her own utility by considering
1See for instance (see [13, 12, 20, 24]).
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this asymmetry of information, given that the utility of the Agent is held to a given level (his
reservation utility). From a game theory point of view, this class of problems can be identified
with a Stackelberg game between the Principal and the Agents, i.e. the Principal anticipates the
best-reaction effort of the Agent and takes it into account to maximize her utility. Moral hazard in
contracting theory, i.e the Principal has no access on the work of her Agent, has been developed
during the 80’s and was investigated in a particular continuous time framework by Holmström
and Milgrom in [17]. We refer to the monographies of Laffont and Martimort [23], Laffont and
Tirole [22], Sung [40] and Cvitanic and Zhang [8] for nice reviews of the literature in this topic
and different situations studied dealing with moral hazard in Principal/Agent problems. More
recently, the noticeable work of Sannikov [37] investigates a stopping time problem in contract
theory by emphasizing the fundamental impact of the value function of the Agent’s problem to
solve the problem of the Principal. This was then mathematically formalized with the works
of Cvitanic, Possamaï and Touzi in [6, 7] by proposing a nice handleable procedure to solve a
large panel of problems in moral hazard. More exactly, they have showed that the Stackelberg
equilibrium between the Agent and the Principal may be reduced to two steps in the studying of
general problems in contracts theory. First, given a fixed contract proposes by the Principal, the
Agent aims at maximizing his utility by finding the best reaction effort associated with the pro-
posed contract. It is well-known, since the works of Rouge and El Karoui [36] and Hu, Imkeller
and Müller [18] that a utility maximization problem can be reduced to solve Backward Stochastic
Differential Equations (BSDE for short, we refer to the works of Pardoux and Peng [31, 32] and
El Karoui, Peng and Quenez [9] for general results related to this theory), and Cvitanic, Possamaï
and Touzi have proved that more generally, when the Agent can control the volatility, the prob-
lem can be reduced to solve a second order BSDE (see for instance the seminal work [39] and the
extension of it with more general conditions [34]). Then, it is proved in [6, 7] that the problem
of the Principal can be reduced to solve a stochastic control problem with state variables of the
problem the output and the value function of the Agent, by using the HJB equations associated
with it and verification theorems.
An extension of moral hazard with a Principal and an Agent, which echoes the example of the
ECB as the Principal and the EU members as the Agents presented above, consists in considering
a Principal dealing with many Agents. Principal/Multi-Agents problems have been investigated
in a one period framework by Hölmstrom [16] (among others) and then extended in the continu-
ous time model by Koo, Shim and Sung in [21] and more recently by Elie and Possamaï in [11]. In
the latter, Elie and Possamaï consider exponential utility functions for the Agents and the Prin-
cipal and they assume that the Agents are rational so that the first step of the procedure to solve
the Agents’ problems remains to find Nash equilibria, which can be reduced to solve a multi-
dimensional quadratic BSDE, as explained in [11]. Nevertheless, by recalling the example of the
ECB and EU members above with question b., we can also consider an other type of interactions
between the Agents.
In microeconomics, we can distinguish two type of interactions between connected agents. Agents
can be considered as rational economical entities and aim at finding their best reaction functions
to maximize their wealths/minimize their costs, in view of the actions of the others. This in-
vestigation consists in finding a Nash equilibrium and fits with a situation in which the (non-
cooperative) agents cannot deviate from this equilibrium. However, as explained with the so-
called prisoner’s dilemma (see Table 2 for more explanation), the configuration obtained is not
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necessarily an optimal choice for the welfare of the system.
Table 2: This example was emphasized by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in the 50’s and then formalized by
Albert W. Tucker. Considers two prisoners P1 and P2 waiting for their interrogation to determine if they are indeed
guilty or not. The prisoners have two choices, they can keep silent or they can denounce the other prisoner. We sum
up the payoffs-vector associated with this situation in the table below, the first (resp. second) component of the vector
is the payoff of P1 (resp. P2). We see that Pareto optima are keep silent-keep silent, denounce-keep silent and keep
silent-denounce and the Nash equilibrium is denounce-denounce, which is the dominant strategy. In particular, if
the two prisoners are forced to play a Pareto optimum, their global payoff is 0 or −9 which is always better than the
natural equilibrium with global payoff −10.
Action of P2
Action of P1
keep silent denounce
keep silent (0, 0) (1,−10)
denounce (−10, 1) (−5,−5)
Welfare economics is a part of microeconomics which aims at determining the degree of well-
being of a situation and Pareto optima are considered as one criterion to measure it. Indeed, a
Pareto optimum consists in finding a configuration in which all the considered entities cannot de-
viate without harming the state of an other entity. Unlike a Nash equilibrium, a Pareto optimum
is not reached using dominant strategies but has to be imposed in a general situation, since ra-
tional entities will reasonably converge to a Nash equilibrium. Finding Pareto optima gives a lot
of information in terms of general equilibrium inside a system of markets and supply/demand
systems, as showed by (among others) Walras in [42] to explain price-setting mechanisms, and
mathematically formulated by Arrow and Debreu in [3] with the celebrated two fundamental
theorems of welfare economics. Roughly speaking, the first fundamental theorem of welfare
economics states that any general equilibrium in a competitive market is (weakly) Pareto opti-
mal. The second states that any Pareto optimum can lead to a general equilibrium by reallocating
initial appropriations. We refer to [28, 2] and the monography [25] for more details on it. It is
however2 not clear that with information asymmetry this equivalence is always true (specially
the second fundamental theorem does not hold), but studying the existence of Pareto optima
seems to be interesting to have relevant information related to general equilibrium in view of
the first theorem. Moral hazard problems dealing with Pareto optimality was studied in a one-
period model in [35] and in a two-period model in [30]. As far as we know, it does not have
been investigated in continuous time models and the present paper is the first who considers
it. Before going further, let us explain how we have to understand the Principal/multi-Agents
problem studied in this work. Since the actions of Agents lead naturally to a Nash equilibrium
(which does not coincides a priori with a Pareto optimum), we have to assume that the Agents
cannot manage their work themselves or are forced to follow a precise strategy. This induces to
introduce a third player in the Principal/multi-Agents game, namely the Planner, who imposes
an effort to the Agents for their well-being. More specifically, the Planner can be seen as a medi-
ator inside a firm who managed the actions of agents or a regulator who forces the Agents to act
for the global interest. The Planer can be for instance a Government who imposes some Labour
laws, by thinking about the global interest of the employees or any other entity who manages ac-
2We for instance refer to [1] for an investigation of this kind of issues.
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tions of Agents hired by a Principal. In this paper, we will distinguish the case where no Planner
impacts the Stackelberg equilibrium, which coincides with the second best case in contract the-
ory and where rational Agents reach to Nash equilibria, to the case in which a Planner manages
the work of the Agents. The structure of the paper is the following:
After having described the Economy studied in Section 2, we extend the result of [11] to general
separable utilities for the Agents, and general utilities for the Principal in Section 3 for the clas-
sical second-best case, named the no-Planner model. We provide conditions on the data ensuring
that the multi-dimensional BSDE associated with Nash equilibria for the Agents is well-posed
as an application of the recent results in [15] (see Appendix B and Remark 3.1). Then, in Section
4 we turn to the model in which a Planner manages the action of Agents. Using the fact that
finding Pareto optima can be reduced to solve a Multi-Objective Optimization Problem (MOOP
for short), we give general forms of some Pareto optima through the solutions of BSDEs and we
solve the problem of the Principal using the HJB equation associated with it. Finally, in Section
5, we apply our results to a linear-quadratic model similar to the applied model studied in [11]
with two Agents having appetence coefficients and we give some interpretations on the relevant
results. We compare the no-Planner model with models in which a Planner intervenes in the
Principal/multi-Agents problem by providing sufficient and necessary conditions such that a
Nash equilibrium is Pareto efficient, and by comparing the value functions of the Principal.
The notations and all the technical details are postponed to Appendix A and B and proofs of
Section 4 are postponed to Appendix C to allege the reading of the paper.
2 The Economy
We consider a finite number N ≥ 1 of Agents hired by one Principal. Each Agent receives from
the Principal a salary at a fixed horizon T > 0 to manage the project of the Principal described
by an RN−valued process X with volatility an MN (R)−valued map denoted by Σ depending
on the output X , given by
Xt :=
∫ t
0
Σ(s,Xs)dWs, t ∈ [0, T ], P− a.s., (2.1)
whereW is anN−dimensional Brownian motion defined on some probability space (Ω,F ,P) fil-
tred with the natural filtration of the Brownian motion F := (Ft)t∈[0,T ]. We assume in this paper
that the volatility Σ is uniformly bounded, the map (t, x) 7−→ Σ(t,Xt) is F−progressively mea-
surable, invertible and such that (2.1) has a unique strong solution with exponential moments.
Remark 2.1. The boundedness of Σ is here for the sake of simplicity, while the invertibility is fundamental
to define properly the weak formulation of the problem as explained in [11].
2.1 Impact of the actions of N−interacting agent
Let A be a subset of R. We assume that any agent can impact, with his effort, both the value of
his assigned project and the values of the other projects. More explicitly, any ith Agent has an
impact on the ith component on X and on the other components managed by the other Agents.
5
We represent the general action of the N Agents by a matrix a ∈ MN (A) where aj,i is the action
of the ith Agent on the project j. Thus, a:,i is the AN−valued column vector of the ith Agent’s
actions. This matrix impacts3 the dynamic (2.1) of X by adding a drift b defined as a map from
[0, T ]×Ω×MN (A) such that for any time t, any space variable x ∈ RN and any effort a ∈MN (A)
of the Agents, we have
b(t, x, a) :=
(
bi
(
t, x, (ai,1, . . . , ai,N )>
))
1≤i≤N
.
For technical reasons, we have to focus on admissible actions of the Agents as a subspace A of
MN (A)−valued process for which the model is well-posed. We refer to Appendix A for a math-
ematical definition of it. Thus, under technical conditions given in the appendix, the dynamic of
X , impacted by any admissible actions a of Agents, is given by
Xt =
∫ t
0
b(s,Xs, as)ds+
∫ t
0
Σ(s,Xs)dW
a
s , (2.2)
where
W a := W −
∫ T
0
Σ(s,Xs)
−1b(s,Xs, as)ds,
is a Brownian motion under some probability measure Pa equivalent to P. We thus work under
the weak formulation of the problem (see [11, Sections 2.1 and 2.2] for more details on it).
Interpretation of (2.2). We first focus on the dependance with respect toX in both the volatility
Σ and the drift b of the project. This classical phenomenon expresses some friction effects between
the different projects managed by the Agents so that each component of the general outcome X
can depend on the values of the others. Turn now to the dependance with respect to the effort of
the Agents. The dynamic of the project i depends on all the efforts provided by theN Agents and
assuming that the ith Agent has preferences depending on the ith component of X , this model
emphasizes exactly an interacting effect between Agents since each Agent can impact positively
or negatively the project managed by an other.
2.2 Stackelberg equilibrium, Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality
It is well known that a moral hazard problem can be identified with a Stackelberg equilibrium
between the Principal and the Agents. In the considered system, the first step consists in finding
a best respond effort provided by the Agents given a sequence of salaries proposed by the Prin-
cipal. In the second step, taking into account the reactions of the Agents, the Principal aims at
maximizing her own utility.
We assume that each Agent is penalized through a cost function depending on his effort. More
precisely, we denote by ki : [0, T ] × RN × AN −→ R the cost function associated with the ith
Agent.
3See Appendix A for mathematical details.
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For any i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we setU i0 : R×MN (A) −→ R the utility of the ith Agent. We will consider
in this paper separable utilities given a sequence (ξi)1≤i≤N of salaries given by the Principal and
an admissible action a chosen by the N -Agents, such that
U i0(ξ
i, a) := EP
a
[
U iA(ξ
i) + Γi(XT )−
∫ T
0
ki(t,Xt, a
:,i)dt
]
,
where U iA : R −→ R is a concave and increasing map so that its inverse U (−1)A is well-defined
and increasing, Γi : RN −→ R is the appetence function of Agent i to manage project i which
satisfies a technical, but not too restrictive, assumption (see Assumption (G) in Appendix A). For
instance, Γi(x) = γi
(
xi − 1N−1
∑
j 6=i x
j
)
, where γi is the appetence of Agent i toward the project
i compared to the other projects.
We recall that any Agent can accept or reject the contract proposed by the Principal through a
reservation utility constrain. More exactly, we denote by C a general set of admissible4 contracts
proposed by the Principal to the Agents, which remains to put technical assumptions ensuring
that all the mathematical objects used in this paper are well-defined and such that for any panel
of contracts ξ := (ξi)1≤i≤N the following reservation utility constrains are satisfied
sup
a∈A
U i0(ξ
i, a) ≥ Ri0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (2.3)
with a reservation utility Ri0 ∈ R for the ith Agent. We denote R0 := (Ri0)1≤i≤N the vector of
reservation utilities.
An interesting problem concerns the intrinsic type of best reaction efforts provided by the Agents.
Two different approaches can be investigated.
One can assume that each Agent provides an optimal effort in view of the actions of the others.
In this case, each Agent aims at finding a best reaction effort given both a salary proposed by
the Principal and other Agents efforts. This situation typically fits with a non-cooperative game
between Agents which reach to find stable equilibria of type Nash equilibria. This problem was
well investigated in [11] by proving that Agents play an equilibrium in view of performance of
others players. Mathematically5, we define a Nash equilibrium for the Agents by the following
Definition 2.1 (Nash equilibrium). Given an admissible contract ξ ∈ C, a Nash equilibrium for the N
Agents is an admissible effort e?(ξ) ∈ A such that for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
sup
e∈Ai((e?(ξ)):,−i)
U i0(ξ
i, a⊗i (e?(ξ)):,−i) = U i0(ξi, (e?(ξ)):,i ⊗i (e?(ξ)):,−i). (2.4)
The main problem of Nash equilibrium is that it is not optimal in general, from a welfare eco-
nomics point of view, of interacting entities (see the prisoner’s dilema in Table 2). It is why in
this paper we will mainly focus on Pareto optima, mathematically defined by
Definition 2.2 (Pareto optimum). An admissible action a∗ ∈ A is Pareto optimal if it does not exist
a ∈ A such that U i0(ξ, a∗) ≤ U i0(ξ, a) for any i = 1, . . . , N and U i0(ξ, a∗) < U i0(ξ, a) for at least one
index i.
4See Appendix A for mathematical details with the definition of C.
5See paragraphs Notations and General model and definitions in Appendix A for the definitions of the operator⊗
and the space of admissible best reaction Ai with (A.3).
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The studied model coincides with a Principal/multi-Agents problem in which an exogenous
entity, called the Planner, forces the Agents to act for the global interest. Given an optimal re-
muneration, the Planner aims at maximizing the global utility of the N -Agents by finding a
Pareto equilibrium. Then, taking the best reaction effort of the Agents into account, the Principal
chooses among the set of contracts those who maximize her utility.
3 Some reminders on the no-Planner model
We assume that no Planner intervenes in the Stackelberg games between Agents and the Princi-
pal and we extend merely the main results in [11] to the case of separable utilities and we omit
the proof since they follow exactly the same lines that [11]. In that case, we consider rational
Agents reaching a Nash equilibrium given an admissible sequence of contracts (ξi)1≤i≤N , which
corresponds to the classical second-best case. Intuitively, we begin to set the paradigm of any ith
Agent. Given a salary ξi given by the Principal and an effort a:,−i provided by the others, Agent
i aims at solving
U i0(ξ, a
:,−i) := sup
a∈Ai(a:,−i)
EP
a⊗ia:,−i
[
U iA(ξ
i) + Γi(XT )−
∫ T
0
ki(t,Xt, a
:,i)dt
]
. (3.1)
Following the same computations than those in [11], by using martingale representation theo-
rems, Problem (3.1) remains to solve
Y it = U iA(ξi) + Γi(XT ) +
∫ T
t
sup
a∈Ai(a:,−i)
{
b(s,Xs, a⊗i a:,−i) · Z is − ki(s,Xs, a)
}
ds−
∫ T
t
Z is ·ΣsdWs,
(3.2)
and by denoting a?NA the maximizer of the generator of this BSDE, we deduce that the A
N -
valued process a?NA(·, X·,Z i· , a:,−i) is the best reaction effort of Agent i given a salary ξi and effort
of the other players a:,−i, where (Y i,Z i) is the unique solution to BSDE (3.2), under technical
assumption stated in Appendix A.
3.1 Nash equilibrium and multidimensional BSDE
Now, each Agent computes his best reaction effort at the same time. We thus have to assume that
for any (t, z, x) ∈ [0, T ]×MN (R)×RN there exists a fixed point a?NA(t, z, x) ∈MN (A) inspiring
by the best reaction effort of Agent i made before. We consider that the following assumption
holds in the following
Assumption 3.1. For any (t, z, x) ∈ [0, T ]×MN (R)× RN , there exists a?NA(t, z, x) ∈ MN (A) such
that
(a?NA)
:,i(t, z, x) ∈ arg max
a∈AN

N∑
j=1
bj
(
t, x, (a⊗i (a?NA):,−i(t, z, x))j,:
)
zj,i − ki(t, x, a)
 .
We denote by A?NA(t, z, x) the set of fixed point a?NA(t, z, x).
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As emphasized by [11], finding a Nash equilibrium for any sequence of salaries (ξi)1≤i≤N is
strongly linked to find a solution to the following multidimensional BSDE
Yt = (U iA(ξi))1≤i≤N + (Γi(XT ))1≤i≤N +
∫ T
t
f?NA(s,Xs,Zs)ds−
∫ T
t
Z>s ΣsdWs, (3.3)
with
f?,iNA(t, x, z) :=
N∑
j=1
bj(t, x, (a?NA)
j,:)zji − ki(t, x, (a?NA):,i), 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
We recall the following definition of a solution to BSDE (3.3)
Definition 3.1. A solution of BSDE (3.3) is a pair (Y, Z) ∈ S∞(RN ) × (S∞(RN ) × HmBMO(RN )) for
some m > 1 satisfying Relation (3.3).
Similarly to Theorem 4.1 in [11], we can now state that there is a one to one correspondance
between a Nash equilibrium and a solution to BSDE (3.3). The proof of this result follows exactly
the same lines that the proof of Theorem 4.1 in [11].
Theorem 3.1. There exists a Nash equilibrium e?(ξ) if and only if there is a unique solution of BSDE
(3.3) in the sense of Definition 3.1. In this case, we have e?t (ξ) ∈ A?NA(t,Xt,Zt) and conversely, any
aNA ∈ A?NA(t,Xt,Zt) is a Nash equilibrium.
Remark 3.1. The previous theorem emphasizes that the existence of a Nash equilibrium is connected to the
existence of a unique solution in the sense of Definition 3.1. As explained in [14], for instance, the problem
is mathematically ill-posed in general and [11] circumvents this problem by imposing the existence of a
solution to BSDE (3.1) in the definition of admissible contracts. However, as soon as the class of admissible
contracts is sufficiently regular, recent results [43, 15] can be applied to ensure that the multidimensional
BSDE (3.3) is well-posed. We refer to Appendix B for more details on this class of admissible contracts
and Proposition B.1 which gives conditions ensuring that their exists a unique solution in the sense of
Definition 3.1 of this BSDE.
3.2 The problem of the Principal and multidimensional HJB equation
As previously, this section is very informal to allege the reading since it is a mere extension of
[11] to separable and general utilities. The results are again completely similar to those in [11]
and can be proved by following exactly the same lines. For the sake of readability, we prefer to
omit it to focus on the proofs of Section 4 below, which is the real contribution of this paper.
Assume that BSDE (3.3) admits a unique solution (Y,Z) ∈ S∞(RN ) × (S∞(RN ) × HmBMO(RN ))
for some m > 1. Let a?NA be a Nash equilibrium selected by the Agents (see [11, Section 4.1.4] for
some selection criterion) or the Principal6 if the Agents cannot select it. Recall that the Principal
6In fact, if the Agents cannot select a Nash equilibrium, then the problem of the Principal is
UP,NA0 = sup
ξ=(ξi)1≤i≤N∈C
a?
NA
∈A?
NA
(X,Z)
EP
a?NA(·,X,Z)
[
UP
(
`(XT )−
N∑
i=1
ξi
)]
,
whereA?NA is the restriction ofA? with selection criterion for the Agents, and the results below are completely similar.
It is why for the sake of simplicity, we assume that only one Nash equilibrium is selected here, to allege the reading.
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aims at solving
UP,NA0 = sup
ξ=(ξi)1≤i≤N∈C
EP
a?NA(·,X,Z)
[
UP
(
`(XT )−
N∑
i=1
ξi
)]
. (3.4)
As explained in [37, 6, 7], by mimicking [11, Section 4.2] and in view of the decomposition (3.3)
of admissible contracts, one can show7 that solving this problem remains to solve a stochastic
control problem with two state variables: the value of the firm X and the value function of
the ith Agent for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. This suggests to introduce the following Hamiltonian
HNA : [0, T ]× RN × RN × RN ×MN (R)×MN (R)×MN (R) −→ R by
HNA(t, x, p, q, P,Q,R) := sup
z∈MN (R)
{
b(t, x, a?NA(t, x, z)) · p+ f?NA(t, x, z) · q
+
1
2
Tr
(
Σ(t, x)Σ(t, x)>P
)
+
1
2
Tr
(
z>Σ(t, x)Σ(t, x)>zQ
)
+ Tr
(
Σ(t, x)Σ(t, x)>zR
)}
.
Thus, the HJB equation associated with (3.4) is
(HJB-Na)
−∂tv(t, x, y)−H
NA(t, x,∇xv,∇yv,∆xxv,∆xyv,∆xyv) = 0, (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T )× RN × RN
v(T, x, y) = UP
(
`(x)−∑Ni=1(U iA)(−1)(yi − Γi(x))) .
As usual, using a classical verification theorem (see for instance [41]) we get the following result
Theorem 3.2. Assume that PDE (HJB-Na) admits a unique solution v continuously differentiable with
respect to t and twice continuously differentiable with respect to its spaces variables and that for any
t, x, p, q, P,Q,R ∈ [0, T ] × RN × RN × RN × MN (R) × MN (R) × MN (R), the supremum in
HNA(t, x, p, q, P,Q,R) is attained for (at least) one z?NA(t, x, p, q, P,Q,R). Moreover, for any Y
i
0 ≥
Ri0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we assume that the following coupled SDE{
X?t = x+
∫ t
0 Σ(s,X
?
s )dWs,
Y ?,Y0t = Y0 −
∫ t
0 f
?
NA(s,X
?
s , z
?,NA
s )ds+
∫ t
0 (z
?,NA
s )>Σ(s,X?s )dWs,
admits a unique solution (X?, Y ?,Y0) where
z?,NAt := z
?
NA(t,X
?
t ,∇xv,∇yv,∆xxv,∆yyv,∆xyv).
If moreover z?,NA ∈ HmBMO(MN (R)) and (U iA)(−1)((Y ?,R0T )i − Γi(X?T )) ∈ C for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N , then
ξ :=
(
(U iA)
(−1)((Y ?,R0T )
i − Γi(X?T ))
)
1≤i≤N
is an optimal contract which solves the Principal problem (3.4) with
UP0 = v(0, x,R0).
7See Section 4.2 which provides a path to do it or [11] for exponential utilities.
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4 Multi Objective Optimization Problem with separable preferences
Assume now that the Agent does not manage their efforts which are chosen by an exogenous
Planner who acts for the welfare of the Agents. We fix a sequence of admissible contracts ξ :=
(ξi)1≤i≤N . As before, in all this section, we work under technical assumptions on the coefficients
b, k given in Appendix A (see Assumption A.1).
4.1 Solving the multi objective problem using scalarization
Let (λi)1≤i≤N be a sequence of nonnegative reals such that
∑N
i=1 λi = 1 and consider the multi-
objective optimization problem
sup
a∈A
N∑
i=1
λiEP
a
[
U iA(ξ
i) + Γi(XT )−
∫ T
0
ki(t,Xt, a
:,i
t )dt
]
. (4.1)
The following proposition gives sufficient conditions to find Pareto optima through solutions to
the MOOP.
Proposition 4.1 (Theorem 3.1.2 in [27]). If their exists λi > 0 for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N}with
∑N
i=1 λi = 1
such that the multi-objective optimization problem (4.1) has a solution denoted by a?(ξ, λ1, . . . , λN ), then
a?(ξ, λ1, . . . , λN ) is Pareto optimal.
The coefficient λi can be seen as the part chosen by the Planner of the utility of Agent i to
maximize the general weighted utility of the Agents.8 Fix a sequence λ := (λi)1≤i≤N with
λi > 0, i = 1, . . . , N . We set for any (t, x, a) ∈ [0, T ]× RN ×MN (A)
UλA(ξ) :=
N∑
i=1
λiU
i
A(ξ
i), Γλ(x) :=
N∑
i=1
λiΓi(x), k
λ(t, x, a) :=
N∑
i=1
λik
i(t, x, a:,i),
Problem (4.1) thus becomes
uλ0(ξ) := sup
a∈A
uλ0(ξ, a), (4.2)
with
uλt (ξ, a) := EP
a
[
UλA(ξ) + Γ
λ(XT )−
∫ T
t
kλ(t,Xt, at)dt
∣∣∣Ft] , t ∈ [0, T ].
We consider the following BSDE for any a ∈ A
Y λ,at = U
λ
A(ξ) + Γ
λ(XT ) +
∫ T
t
(
b(s,Xs, as) · Zλ,as − kλ(s,Xs, as)
)
ds−
∫ T
t
Zλ,as · dXs. (4.3)
We thus have the following Lemma, whose the proof is postponed to Appendix C
Lemma 4.1. BSDE (4.3) admits a unique solution (Y λ,a, Zλ,a) ∈ E(R)×⋂p≥1Hp(RN ) such that
Y λ,at = u
λ
t (ξ, a).
8See [25, Proposition 16.F.1], λi can also be seen as the inverse of the marginal utility of Agent i.
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Let A?(x, z, λ) be defined for any (x, z, λ) ∈ RN × RN × (0, 1)N by
A?(x, z, λ) :=
{
α ∈ A, αs ∈ argmax
a∈MN (A)
{
b(s, x, a) · z − kλ(s, x, a)
}
, for a.e. s ∈ [0, T ]
}
.
We define for any a?(x, z, λ) ∈ A?(x, z, λ)
f?(s, x, z, λ) := b(s, x, a?(x, z, λ)) · z − kλ(s, x, a?(x, z, λ)).
We consider the following BSDE
Y λt = U
λ
A(ξ) + Γ
λ(XT ) +
∫ T
t
f?(s,Xs, Z
λ
s , λ)ds−
∫ T
t
Zλs · dXs (4.4)
The following result solves the problem of the Planner and we refer to Appendix C for its proof.
Theorem 4.1. BSDE (4.4) admits a (unique) solution denoted by (Y λ, Zλ) ∈ E(R) × ⋂p≥1Hp(RN )
such that
Y λ0 = u
λ
0(ξ),
and any a? in A?(X,Zλ, λ) is Pareto optimal for any λ ∈ (0, 1)N such that λ · 1N = 1.
Remark 4.1. Concerning the choice of the parameter λ by the Planner, one can assume that the Planner
is penalized by a bad choice of Pareto optima given some external criteria. For instance, the Planner could
be forced to choose a class of λ depending on the performance of any Agents relatively to the others, e.g.
λi ∈ [ kii∑N
j=1 k
ji
± εi] for some εi > 0 with kji > 0 the underlying cost of the Agent i to manage project j.
Mathematically, the Planner aims at solving for instance
min
λ∈(0,1)N
EP
a?(X,Zλ,λ)
[∫ T
0
cPe(s,Xs, λ)ds
]
,
for some cost function cPe depending on the characteristics of the Agents. An other section criterion could
be to take any parameter λ and the corresponding Pareto optima which are Nash equilibria. Thus, we deal
in the following with a parameter λ? chosen by the Planner due to some selection criterions. If this λ?
is not unique, we assume that the Principal have the final say on this choice and maximizes her utility
over all the selected Pareto optima. We also assume that in this case that A?(X,Zλ? , λ?) is reduced to a
singleton for the sake of simplicity (if not and as usual, the Principal also maximizes her utility on any
Pareto optima with parameter λ?).
4.2 Characterization of the set of admissible contracts
Let (Y λ, Zλ) be the (unique) solution to BSDE (4.4). We fix λ and the Pareto optimum a? in
A?(X,Zλ, λ) (reduced to a singleton for the sake of simplicity as explained in Remark 4.1). We
consider the following BSDE
Y it = U
i
A(ξ
i) + Γi(XT ) +
∫ T
t
(
b(s,Xs, a
?(s,Xs, Z
λ
s , λ)) · Zis − ki(s,Xs, (a?(s,Xs, Zλs , λ)):,i)
)
ds
−
∫ T
t
Zis · dXs (4.5)
We thus have the fundamental following Proposition and we refer to Appendix C for its proof
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Proposition 4.2. For any i = 1, . . . , N , BSDE (4.5) admits a unique solution (Y i, Zi) ∈ E(R) ×⋂
p≥1Hp(RN ) such that
Y i0 = U
i
0(ξ, a
?(s,Xs, Z
λ
s , λ)).
Besides, let (Y λ, Zλ) be the (unique) solution of BSDE (4.4), we have
Y λ =
N∑
i=1
λiY
i, Zλ =
N∑
i=1
λiZ
i
and the following decomposition for any admissible contracts holds for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N
U iA(ξ
i) = Y i0 − Γi(XT )
−
∫ T
0
(
b(s,Xs, a
?(s,Xs, Z
λ
s , λ)) · Zis − ki(s,Xs, (a?(s,Xs, Zλs , λ)):,i)
)
ds+
∫ T
0
Zis · dXs.
(4.6)
In view of Proposition 4.2 above, we have
Y it = Y
i
0 +
∫ t
0
ki(s,Xs, (a
?(s,Xs, Z
λ
s , λ))
:,i)ds+
∫ t
0
Zis · Σ(s,Xs)dW ?s , Y iT = U iA(ξi) + Γi(XT ).
This suggests to introduce a set of contracts Ξ as the set of random variables (U iA)
(−1)(Y i,Z
i,Y0
T −
Γi(XT )) with i ∈ {1, . . . , N} defined by
Y i,Z
i,Y0
t = Y
i
0 +
∫ t
0
ki(s,Xs, (a
?(s,Xs, Z
λ
s , λ))
:,i)ds+
∫ t
0
Zis · Σ(s,Xs)dW ?s , Zλ :=
N∑
i=1
λiZ
i
for any controls ((Zi)1≤i≤N , Y0) ∈ D(RN ) ×
(
[Ri0,+∞)
)
1≤i≤N , where D(R
N ) denotes the set of
controls F-predictable processes (Zi)1≤i≤N ∈ H2(RN ) such that (U iA)(−1)(Y i,Z
i,Y0
T − Γi(XT )) ∈ C.
We set an F-predictable process Z with values inMN (R) such that its coefficient Zi,j is the ith
element of the vector process Zj . In this case we define the RN -valued process
Y Z,Y0t := Y0 +
∫ t
0
K(s,Xs, (a
?(s,Xs, Zs, λ)))ds+
∫ t
0
Z>s Σ(s,Xs)dW
?
s ,
by setting (with an abuse of notation but justified by Proposition 4.2)
a?(s,Xs, Zs, λ) := a
?(s,Xs, Z
λ
s , λ) (4.7)
with Zλ =
(∑N
i=1 λiZ
j,i
)
1≤j≤N
and
K(s,Xs, (a
?(s,Xs, Zs, λ))) := (k
i(s,Xs, (a
?(s,Xs, Zs, λ))
:,i))>1≤i≤N .
In this case, from Proposition 4.2, we get9
C = Ξ. (4.8)
In the following we will denoteMN (RN ) the set of F-predictable processZ with values inMN (R)
such that Z :,i ∈ D(RN ) for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
9The inclusion Ξ ⊂ C is in the definition of Ξ. The inclusion C ⊂ Ξ comes from (4.6) by using martingale represen-
tation.
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4.3 The general problem of the Principal with an exogenous Planner
Using the notation (4.7), we recall that the Principal solves
UP0 = sup
ξ=(ξi)1≤i≤N∈C
EP
a?(X,Zλ,λ)
[
UP
(
`(XT )−
N∑
i=1
ξi
)]
, (4.9)
From Proposition 4.2 and Characterization (4.8), Problem (4.9) becomes
UP0 = sup
Z∈MN (RN )
Y i0≥Ri0
EP
a?(X,Z,λ)
[
UP
(
`(XT )−
N∑
i=1
(U iA)
−1(Y i,Z
:,i,Y i0
T − Γi(XT ))
)]
. (4.10)
Since UP and (U iA)(−1) are increasing, one can explicitly get the optimal Y i0 for any i by saturating
the reservation utility constrains of the Agents, i.e., Y i,?0 = R
i
0. Thus, Problem (4.10) becomes
UP0 = sup
Z∈MN (RN )
EP
a?(X,Z,λ)
[
UP
(
`(XT )−
N∑
i=1
(U iA)
(−1)(Y i,Z
:,i,Ri0
T − Γi(XT ))
)]
. (4.11)
As emphasized above and as an extension of [37, 6, 7], solving (4.11) remains to solve a stochastic
control problem with
• control variable: Z ∈MN (R),
• two state variables: the value of the firmX and the value function of the ith Agent Y i,Z:,i,Ri0
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
We define HPar : [0, T ]× RN × RN × RN ×MN (R)×MN (R)×MN (R)× (0, 1)N −→ R by
HPar(t, x, p, q, P,Q,R, λ) := sup
z∈MN (R)
{
b(t, x, a?(t, x, z, λ)) · p+K(t, x, (a?(t, x, z, λ))) · q
+
1
2
Tr
(
Σ(t, x)Σ(t, x)>P
)
+
1
2
Tr
(
z>Σ(t, x)Σ(t, x)>zQ
)
+ Tr
(
Σ(t, x)Σ(t, x)>zR
)}
.
We thus consider the following HJB equation associated with (4.11)
(HJB-Par)
−∂tv(t, x, y)−H
Par(t, x,∇xv,∇yv,∆xxv,∆xyv,∆xyv, λ) = 0, (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T )× RN × RN
v(T, x, y) = UP
(
`(x)−∑Ni=1(U iA)(−1)(yi − Γi(x))) .
As usual, using a classical verification theorem (see for instance [41]) we get the following result
Theorem 4.2. Assume that PDE (HJB-Par) admits a unique solution v continuously differentiable with
respect to t and twice continuously differentiable with respect to its spaces variables and that for any
t, x, p, q, P,Q,R, λ ∈ [0, T ]×RN ×RN ×RN ×MN (R)×MN (R)×MN (R)× (0, 1)N , the supremum
in HPar(t, x, p, q, P,Q,R, λ) is attained for (at least) one z?(t, x, p, q, P,Q,R, λ). Moreover, for any
Y i0 ≥ Ri0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we assume that the following coupled SDE
X?t = x+
∫ t
0 Σ(s,X
?
s )dWs,
Y ?t = R0 +
∫ t
0
(
K(s,X?s , (a
?(s,X?s , z
?
s , λ)))− (z?s )>b(s,X?s , (a?(s,X?s , z?s ))
)
ds
+
∫ t
0 (z
?
s )
>Σ(s,X?s )dWs,
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admits a unique solution (X?, Y ?) where
z?t := z
?(t,X?t ,∇xv,∇yv,∆xxv,∆yyv,∆xyv, λ).
If moreover (z?):,i ∈ D(RN ) then
ξ :=
(
(U iA)
(−1)((Y ?T )
i − Γi(X?T ))
)
1≤i≤N
∈ C
is an optimal contract which solves the Principal problem (4.9), with
UP0 = v(0, x,R0).
5 Application to a bidimensional linear-quadratic model
We compare the case where a Planner intervenes in the Stackelberg equilibrium between the
Principal and the Agent with the case in which no-Planner acts in the linear-quadratic model
developed in [11].
5.1 The model and characterization of Pareto optima
Let a ∈M2(A), b :M2(R) −→ R2 and k :M2 7−→ R2.
dXt = b(at)dt+ dW
a
t
ai,j action of Agent j on the project i with
b(a) =
(
a11 − a12
a22 − a21
)
, k(a) =
(
k11
2 |a11|2 + k
21
2 |a21|2
k22
2 |a22|2 + k
12
2 |a12|2
)
.
We also assume that their exists γ1, γ2 > 0 such that for any i ∈ {1, 2}
Γi(x) = Γi · x, x ∈ R2, j 6= i,
with
Γ1 = γ(1,−1)>, Γ2 = γ(−1, 1)>, γ ≥ 0.
Then, for any parameter λ = (λ1, λ2) ∈ (0, 1)2 with λ1+λ2 = 1, we have for any z := (zi,j)1≤i,j≤2 ∈
M2(R)
a?(z, λ) =
(
λ1z11+λ2z12
λ1k11
−λ1z11+λ2z12
λ2k12
−λ1z21+λ2z22
λ1k21
λ1z21+λ2z22
λ2k22
)
5.2 Problem of the Principal under the action of a general Planner
UP0 (λ) := sup
Z∈M2(R)
EP
a?(Z,λ)
[
−e−RP (XT ·1N−ξ1−ξ2)
]
.
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We get
UP0 (λ) = sup
Z∈M2(R)
E?
[
−e−RP (
∫ T
0 (b
1+b2)(a?(Z,λ))ds+
∫ T
0 12·dW ?s −
∫ T
0 (k
1+k2)(a?(Z,λ))ds−∫ T0 (Z:,1+Z:,2)·dW ?s )]
= sup
Z∈M2(R)
E?
[
−E
(
−RP
∫ T
0
(12 − (Z :,1s + Z :,2s )) · dW ?s
)
e−RP
∫ T
0 g(λ,Zt)dt
]
where E? := EPa
?(Z,λ)
and W ? := W a
?(Z,λ) and with, by setting λ := 1− λ
g(λ, z) = −RP
2
(
z11 + z12 − 1)2 − RP
2
(
z22 + z21 − 1)2
+
(
λz11 + λz12
λk11
+
λz11 + λz12
λk12
)
+
(
λz21 + λz22
λk22
+
λz21 + λz22
λk21
)
− k
11
2
∣∣∣∣λz11 + λz12λk11
∣∣∣∣2 − k212
∣∣∣∣λz21 + λz22λk21
∣∣∣∣2 − k222
∣∣∣∣λz21 + λz22λk22
∣∣∣∣2 − k122
∣∣∣∣λz11 + λz12λk12
∣∣∣∣2 .
One can show after tedious but easy computations that g is coercive in z1 and z2 and convexe.
The first order conditions are then given by
(FOC)

RP (z
11 + z12 − 1) +
(
λz11+λz12
λk11
)
+ λ
λ
(
λz11+λz12
λk12
)
= 1
k11
+ λ
λk12(
λ
λ
− 1
)
RP (z
11 + z12 − 1) = 0
RP (z
22 + z21 − 1) +
(
λz21+λz22
λk22
)
+ λλ
(
λz21+λz22
λk21
)
= 1
k22
+ λ
λk21(
λ
λ
− 1
)
RP (z
22 + z21 − 1) = 0.
This implies to distinguish λ = 12 or not.
5.2.1 Pareto optima and Optimal contracts with an exogenous Planner
For any λ 6= 12 fixed by an exogenous Planner, (FOC) gives
g(λ, z) =
(
λz11 + λz12
λk11
+
λz11 + λz12
λk12
)
+
(
λz21 + λz22
λk22
+
λz21 + λz22
λk21
)
− k
11
2
∣∣∣∣λz11 + λz12λk11
∣∣∣∣2 − k212
∣∣∣∣λz21 + λz22λk21
∣∣∣∣2 − k222
∣∣∣∣λz21 + λz22λk22
∣∣∣∣2 − k122
∣∣∣∣λz11 + λz12λk12
∣∣∣∣2 .
By maximizing the function g, we get the following general Pareto optima conditions
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
z11Pe =
|1−λ|2k12
|λ|2k11+|1−λ|2k12
z21Pe =
|1−λ|2k22
|λ|2k21+|1−λ|2k22
z22Pe =
|λ|2k21
|λ|2k21+|1−λ|2k22
z12Pe =
|λ|2k11
|λ|2k11+|1−λ|2k12
a?(zPe, λ) =
 λz11Pe+(1−λ)z12Peλk11 −λz11Pe+(1−λ)z12Pe(1−λ)k12
−λz21Pe+(1−λ)z22Pe
λk21
λz21Pe+(1−λ)z22Pe
(1−λ)k22

UP0 (λ) = −e−RPTg(λ,zPe)
Thus, given a Pareto optimum of parameter λ ∈ (0, 1) \ {12} chosen by the Planner, the optimal
contracts given to Agent 1 and Agent 2 are respectively
ξ1,? = R10 +
T
2
(∣∣λz11Pe + (1− λ)z12Pe∣∣2
|λ|2k11 +
∣∣λz21Pe + (1− λ)z22Pe∣∣2
|λ|2k21
)
− Tz11Pe
(
λz11Pe + (1− λ)z12Pe
λk11
+
λz11Pe + (1− λ)z12Pe
(1− λ)k12
)
− Tz21Pe
(
λz21Pe + (1− λ)z22Pe
(1− λ)k22 +
λz21Pe + (1− λ)z22Pe
λk21
)
+ (z11Pe − γ)X1T + (z21Pe + γ)X2T .
and
ξ2,? = R20 +
T
2
(∣∣λz11Pe + (1− λ)z12Pe∣∣2
|1− λ|2k12 +
∣∣λz21Pe + (1− λ)z22Pe∣∣2
|1− λ|2k22
)
− Tz12Pe
(
λz11Pe + (1− λ)z12Pe
λk11
+
λz11Pe + (1− λ)z12Pe
(1− λ)k12
)
− Tz22Pe
(
λz21Pe + (1− λ)z22Pe
(1− λ)k22 +
λz21Pe + (1− λ)z22Pe
λk21
)
+ (z12Pe + γ)X
1
T + (z
22
Pe − γ)X2T .
Notice that g admits a maximum in λ = 12 . We can deduce that the case λ =
1
2 coincides with a
cooperative Planner with the Principal.
Remark 5.1. In fact, notice that λ ∈ (0, 1) −→ g(λ, zPe) has a continuous extension when λ → 0 or
λ→ 1, which corresponds to weak Pareto optima (see [27, Theorem 3.1.1]). In this case, we set
g(0) := g(0, zPe) =
1
2k11
+
1
2k21
, g(1) := g(1, zPe) =
1
2k22
+
1
2k12
.
5.2.2 Pareto optimum with a cooperative Planner
It remains to the case where the Planner and the Principal cooperate by choosing λ1 = 12 = λ2.
The first order conditions (FOC) induces the following Pareto optima conditions
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
z11Pc + z
12
Pc = 1
z22Pc + z
21
Pc = 1
aλ,?(zPc) =
(
1
k11
− 1
k12
− 1
k21
1
k22
)
UP0 = −e−RPTg(0.5),
with
g(0.5) := g(0.5, z1Pc, z
2
Pc) =
(
1
2k11
+
1
2k12
)
+
(
1
2k22
+
1
2k21
)
.
We thus have the following optimal contracts for Agent 1 and Agent 2 respectively
ξ1,? = R10 + T
(
1
2k11
+
1
2k21
)
− Tz11Pc
(
1
k11
+
1
k12
)
− Tz21Pc
(
1
k21
+
1
k22
)
+ (z11Pc − γ)X1T + (z21Pc + γ)X2T ,
and
ξ2,? = R20 + T
(
1
2k12
+
1
2k22
)
− Tz12Pc
(
1
k11
+
1
k12
)
− Tz22Pc
(
1
k21
+
1
k22
)
+ (z12Pc + γ)X
1
T + (z
22
Pc − γ)X2T .
Interpretations.
(i) We find the first-best effort cf [11, Theorem 3.3.] which is both a Nash equilibrium in the
first best model and a Pareto optimum with a cooperative Planner.
(ii) We get in the case of a cooperative Planner infinitely number of optimal contracts which
differs clearly form the classical case and results in [11].
(iii) If k11 ≤ k22 and k21 ≤ k12, i.e. Agent 1 is more efficient that Agent 2 to manage his project
and to help Agent 2 to manage his project. Take z11Pc = z
22
Pc = 1 each Agent strictly will
receive the value of his own project. Fixed part is greater for Agent 1 than for Agent 2.
(iv) If k12 ≥ k11, i.e. Agent 1 is more efficient with project 1 than Agent 2, the part of the project
1 given to Agent 1 is greater than the part of this project given to Agent 2 and depend of
the relative performance of this Agent compared to the others. We get similar results with
project 2.
(v) Notice that for any Pareto coefficients, the optimal effort of each Agent is always a booster
of each project. At the equilibrium, each Agent does not penalize the project of the others.
This phenomenon indeed appears as soon as the appetence coefficients are different for
Agent 1 and Agent 2 as emphazised in [11].
(vi) Finally, notice that at the optimum, the appetence parameter γ does not impact the value
function of the Principal and optimal efforts. More exactly, in this model the Principal
proposes optimal contracts to the Agents which cancelled their ambitious in their works
and such that ambitions of the Agents have no impact on the value of the Principal. Besides,
we recover the suppression of the appetence for competitions of the Agent by the Principal
since she penalizes each ith Agent with the amount −γ(XiT −XjT ), i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, as in [11].
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5.2.3 Comparison with the no-Planner model
We now turn to a comparison between a model in which a Planner manages the effort of the
Agents and a model in which Agents are rational entities who aim at finding a Nash equilibrium.
Using [11] and results of Section 3, the Nash equilibrium is given for any z ∈M2(R) by
e?(z) =
(
z11
k11
− z12
k12
− z21
k21
z22
k22
)
The problem of the Principal is then to solve
UP,NA0 := sup
ξ1,ξ2∈C
E?
[
−e−RP (XT ·1N−ξ1−ξ2)
]
.
We get
UP0 = sup
Z
E?
[
−E
(
−RP
∫ T
0
(12 − (Z1s + Z2s )) · dW ?s
)
e−RP
∫ T
0 gNA(Zt,RP )dt
]
with
gNA(z,RP ) = −RP
2
(
z11 + z12 − 1)2 − RP
2
(
z22 + z21 − 1)2
+
(
z11
k11
+
z12
k12
+
z21
k21
+
z22
k22
)
− k
11
2
∣∣∣∣z11k11
∣∣∣∣2 − k212
∣∣∣∣z21k21
∣∣∣∣2 − k222
∣∣∣∣z22k22
∣∣∣∣2 − k122
∣∣∣∣z12k12
∣∣∣∣2 .
Noticing that gNA is coercive and convexe, one get from the first order conditions the following
solutions 
z11NA =
1+RP k
12
1+RP (k12+k11)
z12NA =
1+RP k
11
1+RP (k12+k11)
z22NA =
1+RP k
21
1+RP (k21+k22)
z21NA =
1+RP k
22
1+RP (k21+k22)
e?(z) =
(
z11NA
k11
− z12NA
k12
− z21NA
k21
z22NA
k22
)
UP,NA0 = −e−RPTgNA(z,RP )
In this case, optimal contracts are given by
ξ1,? = R10 + T
(
1
2k11
+
1
2k21
)
− Tz11NA
(
z11NA
k11
+
z12NA
k12
)
− Tz21NA
(
z21NA
k21
+
z22NA
k22
)
+ (z11NA − γ)X1T + (z21NA + γ)X2T
and
ξ2,? = R20 + T
(
1
2k12
+
1
2k22
)
− Tz12NA
(
z11NA
k11
+
z12NA
k12
)
− Tz22NA
(
z21NA
k21
+
z22NA
k22
)
+ (z12NA + γ)X
1
T + (z
22
NA − γ)X2T .
The result below gives necessary and sufficient conditions for which the Nash equilibrium coin-
cides with a Pareto equilibrium.
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Proposition 5.1 (Suffisant and necessary conditions). Assume thatA is convex. The Nash equilibrium
e? is a Pareto optimum if and only if there exists λ? ∈ (0, 1) such that
1 +RPk
12
1 +RP (k12 + k11)
=
λ?z11Pe + (1− λ?)z12Pe
λ?
1 +RPk
22
1 +RP (k21 + k22)
=
λ?z21Pe + (1− λ?)z22Pe
λ?
1 +RPk
12
1 +RPk11
=
1 +RPk
22
1 +RPk21
=
1− λ?
λ?
.
In this case e? coincides with Pareto optimum with parameter λ?.
Proof. Since A is convex, we notice that a 7−→ U i0(ξ, a) is concave since b is linear and k is convex
with respect to a and by using comparison of BSDEs (see [5] for instance). Thus, finding a Pareto
equilibrium is equivalent to find λ? such that their exists a solution of the multi-objective problem
from [27, Theorem 3.1.7].
Now, a Nash equilibrium e? is Pareto optimal if and only if there exists λ? ∈ (0, 1) such that
1 +RPk
12
1 +RP (k12 + k11)
=
λ?z11Pe + (1− λ?)z12Pe
λ?
1 +RPk
11
1 +RP (k12 + k11)
=
λ?z11Pe + (1− λ?)z12Pe
(1− λ?)
1 +RPk
22
1 +RP (k21 + k22)
=
λ?z21Pe + (1− λ?)z22Pe
λ?
1 +RPk
21
1 +RP (k21 + k22)
=
λ?z21Pe + (1− λ?)z22Pe
1− λ? .
By rewriting these conditions, we get the result.
Toy models in which Nash equilibrium are Pareto optimal.
• The Nash equilibrium is Pareto efficient with λ? = 12 if and only if RP = 0 (the Principal is
risk-neutral).
• Assume that k11 = k21 and k22 = k12, i.e. the cost of the effort of the Agent i is the same
towards the project i or the project j. In this case, we necessarily have
λ? =
1 +RPk
11
2 +RP (k11 + k22)
∈ (0, 1).
Then, the Nash equilibrium e?(ξ) coincides with a Pareto optimum with parameter λ? if
and only if
1 +RPk
22
1 +RP (k22 + k11)
=
(1− λ?)2k22 + (1− λ?)λ?k11
|λ?|2k11 + (1− λ?)2k22 .
We now turn to a last interesting results remaining to say that the Principal can benefit from the
action of a Planner to broke the Stackelberg game between her and her Agents.
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Proposition 5.2 (Advantage of adding a Planner). There exists a (non-empty) set of parameters Λ ⊂
(0, 1) such that UP,NA0 ≤ UP0 (λ) , for any λ ∈ Λ, i.e. adding a Planner can improve the value of the
Principal.
Moreover, UP,NA0 > U
P
0 (0) and U
P,NA
0 > U
P
0 (1). In other words, a Planner choosing weak Pareto
optima does not improve the value function of the Principal compared to a no-Planner model.
Proof. For any z ∈M2(R), notice that gNA(zNA, RP ) ≤ g(0.5). Thus,
UPNA0 = −e−RPTgNA(z,RP ) ≤ −e−RP g(0.5) = UP0
(
1
2
)
.
Thus, by using the continuity with respect to λ of λ 7−→ −e−RP g(λ), we deduce that there exists a
set Λ ⊂ (0, 1) such that 12 ∈ Λ and UPNA0 ≤ UP0 (λ) for any λ ∈ Λ.
A tedious computation shows that R > 0 7−→ gNA(zNA, R) is decreasing, and
lim
R→+∞
gNA(zNA, R) =
k12
k11+k12
k11
(
1− k
12
2(k11 + k12)
)
+
k11
k11+k12
k12
(
1− k
11
2(k11 + k12)
)
+
k22
k22+k21
k21
(
1− k
22
2(k22 + k21)
)
+
k21
k22+k21
k22
(
1− k
21
2(k22 + k21)
)
Thus, by using Remark 5.1, easy computations directly give limR→+∞ gNA(zNA, R) > 12k11 +
1
2k21
= g(0) and limR→+∞ gNA(zNA, R) > 12k12 +
1
2k22
= g(1).
We illustrate this proposition with the Figure 1 below. Notice that λ 7−→ UP0 (λ) has the same
monotonicity than λ 7−→ g(λ, zPe or Pc). Thus comparing g(λ, zPe or Pc) with gNA(R, zNA) is
enough to compare the value functions of the Principal with and without a Planner. We notice in
particular that the length of the set Λ is decreasing with the risk aversion of the Principal.
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Figure 1: Comparison between l ∈ (0, 1) 7−→ g(l, zPe or Pc) (see the blue curve and the blue
point for l = 12 ) and gNA(R, zNA) for R ∈ {0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 50} (see the horizontal red curves)
by adding the weak Pareto optima for l ∈ {0, 1} (see the green points). Cost Parameters chosen
are k11 = 2, k22 = 5, k12 = 1, k21 = 10. In this case for any R > 0, we have gNA(zNA, R) ≥
lim
R→+∞
gNA(zNA, R) = 0.7 > max (g(0), g(1)) = g(1) = 0.6. Thus, the set of Pareto optima
Λ ensuring a better value for the Principal compared to the case without adding a Planner is
composed by all the λ ∈ (0, 1) such that the blue curve is above the red curve with corresponding
risk-aversion parameter R > 0.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proved that in a linear-quadratic model there exists configurations such
that Nash equilibria are Pareto efficient (see Proposition 5.1). We also have seen that it is some-
times advantageous from the Principal point of view, to add a Planner in the model who imposes
Pareto optimal actions to the Agents, compared to the case in which the Agents are rational,
non-cooperative, and compute themselves their best-reaction effort (see Proposition 5.2). On the
contrary, if the Planner chooses a weak Pareto optimum, then the value of the Principal is always
worse than a no-Planner model. We would like to propose some extensions to this work for the
path of future researches which might also be worth investigating.
First extension will consist in the studying of classical exponential utilities for the Agents. The
main issue of this work is indeed that we assume that Agents are risk neutral in the application
in order to make all the computations. In this case, we do not fit with separable utilities and the
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scalarization method proposed to solve the problem does not work. An other approach which
could be considered should be to use other methods to find Pareto optima, see for instance [27],
more tractable for exponential utilities.
The second extension is directly linked to Remark 4.1 since the natural question which is not
considered in the present work is to wonder what is happening if the Planner is not exogenous
in the sense that he is also hired by the Principal. In this case, the Planner has to be seen as a
consulting mediator which aims at finding Pareto optima and which is remunerated by the Princi-
pal. This required to modify the classical Stackelberg-type approach by adding this third player
in the game.
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A The mathematical model and general notations
In this section we set all the notations and spaces used in this paper in the paragraphs "Gen-
eral notations" and "Spaces" respectively. We also defined mathematically the considered model
in Paragraph "General model and definitions" and we put the general assumptions which are
supposed to be satisfied in all the paper.
General notations. Let R be the set of reals. Let m and n be two positive integers. We denote by
Mm,n(R) the set of matrices withm rows and n columns, and simplify the notations whenm = n,
by usingMn(R) :=Mn,n(R). We denote by Idn ∈Mn(R) the identity matrix of order n and 0N ∈
Mn(R) the zero-valued coefficients matrix. For anyM ∈Mm,n(R), we defineM> ∈Mn,m(R) as
the usual transpose of the matrix M . We will always identify Rn withMn,1(R). For any matrix
M ∈ Mn(R) and for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n we denote by M :,i its ith column and similarly we denote by
M i,: its ith row. Besides, for any x ∈ Rn, we denote its coordinates by x1, . . . , xn. We denote by
‖·‖ the Euclidian norm onRn, when there is no ambiguity on the dimension. The associated inner
product between x ∈ Rn and y ∈ Rn is denoted by x ·y. We also denote by 1n the n−dimensional
vector (1, . . . , 1)>. Similarly, for any x ∈ Rn, we define for any i = 1, . . . , n, x−i ∈ Rn−1 as the
vector x without its ith component, that is to say x−i := (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn)>. For any
(a, a˜) ∈ R× Rn−1, and any i = 1, . . . , n, we define the following n−dimensional vector
a⊗i a˜ := (a˜1, . . . , a˜i−1, a, a˜i, . . . , a˜n−1).
For any (α, M˜) ∈ Rn×Mn,n−1(R), and any i = 1, . . . , n, we define the following n−dimensional
matrix
α⊗i M˜ := (M˜ :,1, . . . , M˜ :,i−1, α, M˜ :,i, . . . , M˜ :,n−1).
For any Banach space (E, ‖ · ‖E), let f be a map from E × Rn into R. For any x ∈ E, we denote
by ∇af(x, a) the gradient of a 7−→ f(x, a), and we denote by ∆aaf(x, a) the Hessian matrix
of a 7−→ f(x, a) and similarly we denote by ∇xf(x, a) the gradient of x 7−→ f(x, a), and we
denote by ∆xxf(x, a) the Hessian matrix of x 7−→ f(x, a). Finally, we denote by U (−1)A the inverse
function of any UA : E −→ R if it exists.
Spaces. For any finite dimensional normed space (E, ‖·‖E), P(E) (resp. Pr(E)) will denote the
set of E−valued, F−adapted processes (resp. F−predictable processes) and for any p ≥ 1 we set
E(E) :=
{
Y ∈ P(E), càdlàg, such that for all p ≥ 1, E
[
exp
(
p sup
t∈[0,T ]
‖Yt‖E
)]
< +∞
}
,
S∞(E) :=
{
Y ∈ P(E), càdlàg, such that ‖Y ‖S∞(E) := sup
t∈[0,T ]
‖Yt‖E < +∞
}
,
Hp(E) :=
{
Z ∈ Pr(E), ‖Z‖pHp(E) := E
[(∫ T
0
‖Zt‖2Edt
)p/2]
< +∞
}
HpBMO(E) :=
{
Z ∈ Hp(E), ∃C > 0, ∀τ ∈ T , E
[∫ T
τ
‖Zs‖2ds
∣∣∣Fτ] ≤ C2, P− a.s.} .
HpBMO(E) is the so-called set of predictable processes Z such that the stochastic integral is a BMO-
martingale. We refer to [19] for more details on this space and properties related to this theory.
We also denote E(M) the classical Doleans-Dade exponential of any local F-martingale M .
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General model and definitions. We assume that the following technical assumptions hold in
this paper
Assumption A.1. For any i = 1, . . . , N and any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×RN , the map a ∈ RN 7−→ bi(t, x, a) is
continuously differentiable, the map (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×RN 7−→ bi(t, x, a) is F−progressive and measurable
for any a ∈ RN and we assume that their exists a positive constant C such that for any (t, x, a) ∈
[0, T ]× RN × RN
|bi(t, x, a)| ≤ C(1 + ‖x‖+ ‖a‖), ‖∇abi(t, x, a)‖ ≤ C. (A.1)
For any i = 1, . . . , N the map (t, x) 7−→ ki(t, x, a) is F−progressive and measurable. Moreover, the
map a 7−→ ki(t, x, a) is increasing, convex and continuously differentiable for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × RN .
Assume also that there exists κ > 0, l ≥ 1,m,m > 0 such that
l +m
m+ 1− l ∨
m+ 2− l
m+ 1− l ≤ 2, (A.2)
and for any (t, x, a) ∈ [0, T ]× RN ××RN
0 ≤ ki(s, x, a) ≤ C
(
1 + ‖x‖+ ‖a‖l+m
)
,
‖∇aki(s, x, a)‖ ≥ κ‖a‖m, and lim|a|→∞
ki(s, x, a)
‖a‖ = +∞.
Remark A.1. In the classical linear-quadratic framework, l = m = m = 1 and Condition (A.2) holds.
This condition will be fundamental to prove Theorem 4.1 (see the Appendix C).
Assumption (G). For any p ≥ 1 and for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
E
[
exp
(
pΓi(XT )
)]
< +∞.
In order to define a probability Pa equivalent to P such thatW a := W−∫ T0 Σ(s,Xs)−1b(s,Xs, as)ds
is a Brownian motion under Pa, we need to introduce the setA of admissible effort. An F-adapted
andMN (A)-valued process α is said admissible if
(
E
(∫ t
0 b(s,Xs, αs) · Σ(s,Xs)−1dWs
))
t∈[0,T ]
is
an F-martingale and if for the same l,m appearing in Assumption A.1 we have for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N
and any p ≥ 1
E
[
exp
(
p
∫ T
0
‖α:,is ‖l+mds
)]
< +∞.
We also define for any RN−1-valued and F-adapted process a:,−i the set Ai(a:,−i) by
Ai(a:,−i) := {α, RN -valued and F-adapted s.t. α⊗i a:,−i ∈ A} . (A.3)
Now, in order to use the theory of quadratic BSDE and apply the result of for instance [4, 5], we
must define the set of admissible contracts C as the set of FT -measurable and RN -valued random
variable ξ satisfying the constrain (2.3) and such that
E
[
exp
(
p
N∑
i=1
|U iA(ξi)|
)]
< +∞.
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B Multidimensional quadratic growth BSDEs: application of the re-
sults in [15]
The aim of this section is to provide conditions ensuring that Theorem 3.1 holds, by giving a set
of admissible contracts for which there exists a solution to the multi-dimensional BSDE (3.3). We
consider the set of admissible contract
CNA :=
{
ξ ∈ C, ξ ∈ D1,2, ‖Dξ‖S∞(RN ) < +∞
}
,
where D1,2 is the classical of random variables which are Malliavin differentiable.
Recall that under Assumption A.1, from [10, Lemma 4.1], for any (s, x, z) ∈ [0, T ] × RN × RN
there exists
a?NA(s, x, z) ∈ arg max
a∈Ai(a:,−i)
{
b(s, x, a⊗i a:,−i) · z − ki(s, x, a)
}
,
satisfying
‖a?NA(s, x, z)‖ ≤ Ca
(
1 + ‖z‖ 1m+1−l
)
.
We assume that
(Db) The map x 7−→ bi(s, x, a) is continuously differentiable such that there exists Cb > 0 with
‖∇xbi(s, x, a)‖ ≤ Cb,
(Dk) The map x 7−→ ki(s, x, a) is continuously differentiable such that there exists Ck > 0 with
‖∇xki(s, x, a)‖ ≤ Ck(1 + ‖a‖l+m),
and moreover
‖∇aki(s, x, a)‖ ≤ Ck
(
1 + |a|l+m−1
)
,
(Da) The map x 7−→ a?(s, x, z) is continuously differentiable such that there exists Ca > 0 with
|(a?):,i(s, x, z)|+ |(a?)j,:(s, x, z)| ≤ Ca(1 + ‖z‖
1
m−1+l ).
Thus, for any (t, x, z) ∈ [0, T ]× RN ×MN (R)
∇xf?,iNA(t, x, z) =
N∑
j=1
[ (∇xbj(t, x, (a?)j,:) +∇abj(t, x, (a?)j,:)∇x(a?)j,:) zji
−∇xki(t, x, (a?NA):,i)−∇aki(t, x, (a?NA):,i)∇x(a?)j,:
]
.
Lemma B.1. Under Assumptions A.1, (Db), (Dk), (Da) and assume that l+m ≤ 2(m− 1 + l), we have
for any (s, x, z) ∈ [0, T ]× RN ×MN (R)
‖∇xf?,iNA(t, x, z)‖ ≤ Cf (1 + ‖z‖2),
with Cf := Cb + 2CCa + 2CkN(1 + |Ca|l+m−1(1 + Ca)).
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Proof. We compute directly
‖∇xf?,iNA(t, x, z)‖ ≤
N∑
j=1
[ (‖∇xbj(t, x, (a?)j,:)‖+ ‖∇abj(t, x, (a?)j,:)∇x(a?)j,:‖) |zji|
+ ‖∇xki(t, x, (a?NA):,i)‖+ ‖∇aki(t, x, (a?NA):,i)∇x(a?)j,:‖
]
≤ Cb
N∑
j=1
|zji|+ CCa(1 + ‖z‖
1
m−1+l )
N∑
j=1
|zji|+ CkN(1 + |Ca|l+m(1 + ‖z‖
l+m
m−1+l ))
+ CkN
(
1 + |Ca|l+m−1(1 + ‖z‖
l+m−1
m−1+l )
)
≤ Cb‖z‖+ CCa(1 + ‖z‖
1
m−1+l )‖z‖+ CkN(1 + |Ca|l+m(1 + ‖z‖
l+m
m−1+l ))
+ CkN
(
1 + |Ca|l+m−1(1 + ‖z‖
l+m−1
m−1+l )
)
≤ Cb + 2CCa + 2CkN(1 + |Ca|l+m−1(1 + Ca))
+ ‖z‖2
(
Cb + 2CCa + CkN |Ca|l+m−1(1 + Ca)
)
≤ Cf (1 + ‖z‖2).
We now introduce a localisation of f? defined by f?M (s, x, z) := f
?(s, x, ρM (z)) where ρM satisfies
projection properties on a ball centred on 0N with radius M . We denote by (YM , ZM ) the unique
solution of BSDE (3.3) with generator f?M , which fits the classical Lipschitz BSDE framework. For
all p > 1 we set the following assumption
(BMO,p) There exists a positive contant K such that10
(i) KCfC
′
p <
1
2 ,
(ii) supM∈RM
∥∥∥∫ T0 (ZMs )>ΣsdWs∥∥∥BMO ≤ K.
As a direct11 consequence of [15, Theorem 3.1] and Lemma B.1 we have the following proposition
Proposition B.1. Let p > 1 and let Assumptions A.1 (Db), (Dk), (Da), (BMO,p) be true with l+m ≤
2(m − 1 + l), then for any ξ ∈ CNA, the N-dimensional quadratic BSDE (3.3) has a unique solution in
the sense of Definition 3.1.
10The positive constant C′p comes from Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality, see Section 1.1 paragraph Inequalities-
BDG in [15] for more details.
11After having discussed with Jonathan Harter, assumption (Df,b), (iii) in [15] is not a canonical assumption for the
proof of [15, Theorem 3.1]. Indeed, in this paper, the authors needs this assumption only to ensure that the BSDE with
projector fM admits Malliavin differentiable solution as an application of [9]. However, as explained in [26, Section
5 and Section 6] this assumption can be removed in the Markovian case. The author thanks Jonathan Harter for this
clarification.
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C Technical proofs of Section 4
First recall that under Assumption A.1, from [10, Lemma 4.1], for any (s, x, z, λ) ∈ [0, T ]× RN ×
RN × (0, 1)N there exists
a?(s, x, z, λ) ∈ argmax
a∈MN (A)
{
b(s, x, a) · z − kλ(s, x, a)
}
,
satisfying
‖a?(s, x, z, λ)‖ ≤ Ca
(
1 + ‖z‖ 1m+1−l
)
. (C.1)
We now turn to the proofs of the main results in Section 4
Proof of Lemma 4.1. The fact that BSDE (4.3) admits a unique solution (Y λ,a, Zλ,a) ∈ E(R) ×⋂
p≥1Hp(RN ) is a direct consequence of [5] using the definition of C, A and Assumptions A.1
and (G) in Appendix A. Now by changing the probability in BSDE (4.3) and by taking the condi-
tional expectation we directly get Y λ,at = u
λ
t (ξ, a).
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Using (C.1) together with Condition (A.2), the definition of C, A and As-
sumptions A.1 and (G), we obtain from (for instance) [5] the existence and uniqueness of a so-
lution (Y λ, Zλ) ∈ E(R) × ⋂p≥1Hp(RN ) of BSDE (4.4). Now, by using a comparison theorem
for BSDE (4.3) (see for instance [5, Theorem 5]), we deduce that Y λ0 = u
λ
0(ξ) and that any a
? in
A?(X,Zλ, λ) is Pareto optimal from Proposition 4.1.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Let (Y λ, Zλ) ∈ E(R) × ⋂p≥1Hp(RN ) be the solution of BSDE (4.4) from
Theorem 4.1. The fact that BSDE (4.5) admits a unique solution (Y i, Zi) in E(R)×⋂p≥1Hp(RN ) is
a direct consequence of the definitions of C andA. Changing the probability by using Girsanov’s
theorem, we directly get
Y i0 = U
i
0(ξ, a
?(s,Xs, Z
λ
s , λ)).
Denote by Yλ := ∑Ni=1 Y i and Zλ := ∑Ni=1 Zi, we notice that the pair of process (Yλ,Zλ) is
solution of
Yλt = UλA(ξ) +
∫ T
t
(
b(s,Xs, a
?(s,Xs, Z
λ
s , λ)) · Zλs − kλ(s,Xs, (a?(s,Xs, Zλs , λ))
)
ds−
∫ T
t
Zλs · dXs.
Using the uniqueness of the solution (Y λ, Zλ) of BSDE (4.4), we deduce that Yλ = Y λ and Zλ =
Zλ.
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